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MINNESOTA AND DELAWARE INCORPORATION
COMPARISON OF BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW OF
MINNESOTA AND DELAWARE
By JOSEPH H. COLAIAN* and JOHN F. FINN, JR.fO NE WHo contemplates organizing a corporation to do business
in Minnesota must at the outset dispose of one important
question-whether to incorporate under the laws of Minnesota or
under the laws of some foreign state. This question, in the great
majority of cases, is one of choosing between incorporating in
Minnesota or in Delaware. For years, because of the broad powers
of management conferred by Delaware statutes upon the board of
directors, and because of other liberal provisions in statutes of that
state, the Delaware corporation has been a conventional business
entity. Recently, other states have enacted modern corporation
codes which remove many of the reasons that originally made
Delaware corporations preferable; but the practice of incorporating
in Delaware persists to a large extent.
In a particular case, because of the location of the prospective
corporation's assets or places of business, or because of desirable
statutory provisions as to particular types of corporations, or to
assist in minimizing taxation, it may be necessary to inquire into
the laws of other states with a view to organizing in one of them.
However, in the typical instance, for Minnesota attorneys and their
clients the choice lies between Minnesota and Delaware. This dis-
cussion is limited to a comparison of the laws of these two states,
particularly of the salient provisions of their respective business
corporation statutes.1 Generally speaking, there is no great differ-
ence between the common law of the two states with respect to
business corporations.
I. EXPENSE OF INCORPORATION AND REPORTS
A corporation with authorized par value shares of $25,000 can
be organized under Minnesota lav for a fee of $25, the minimum
*Member of firm of Junell, Fletcher, Dorsey, Barker & Colman. Min-
neapolis. Member of Drafting Division, Minnesota State Bar Association
Committee on Corporation Act.
-Associated with firm of Junell, Fletcher, Dorsey, Barker & Colman.
Minneapolis.
1Because the Business Corporation Acts of Minnesota and Delaware are
referred to frequently in the ensuing discussion, much needless repetition
has been avoided by use in the footnotes of the following abbreviations:
Minn. Stat. (Mason's 1927 Minnesota Statutes, 1936 Supplement); Del.
Code (1935 Delaware Revised Code).
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fee, plus filing fees and the cost of publishing a notice of incorpo-
ration. Each additional $1,000 par value of authorized shares adds
fifty cents to the filing fee. Shares without par value, for this
purpose, are considered to have a par value of $10 each.3 In nany
cases, the initial fee paid to the State of Delaware is lower.' low-
ever, assuming that business is to be conducted in Minnesota, it is
necessary to qualify in this state, which requires payment of at
least the minimum fee of $50.5 Furthermore, all Delaware corpora-
tions must pay an annual license fee to the State of Delaware" and
must maintain an office or resident agent there.1  The mininmm
annual charge of the corporations which ordinarily act as such
resident agents is $50.
A Delaware corporation must file an annual report in that
state," and, if qualified to transact business in Minnesota, must also
file an annual report here.' Minnesota corporations, on the other
hand, are not required to file such reports.
2Minn. Stat., sec. 7475 (1).
3Minn. Stat., sec. 7475 (a). The statute makes an exception where
shares without par value have priority over other shares on involuntary
liquidation. The involuntary liquidation price is the par value of such
shares for this purpose.4 The minimum filing fee in Delaware is $10. Fees based on par value
stock are computed as follows: 1 cent per share of authorized capital stock
up to 20,000 shares; Y cent per share from 20,001 to 200,000 shares;
Y5 cent per share for shares in excess of 200,000; and each $100 unit of
par value stock is a taxable share. If stock is without par value, the fol-
lowing schedule applies: Y cent per share up to 20,000 shares; % cent
per share from 20,001 to 2,000,000 shares; and 3,4 eent per share for shares
in excess of 2,000,000. Del. Code, sec. 2104, 72.
5Minn. Stat., sec. 7495-6.
6Delaware, Revised Code 1935, sec. 98, 64, as amended by ch. 5. 1937
Laws. This annual franchise tax is computed upon the basis of the total
number of shares of authorized capital stock as follows: 250 shares or less.
$5; 250 to 1,000 shares. $10; 1,000 to 3,000 shares, $20; 3,000 to 5,000
shares, $25; 5,000 to 10,000 shares, $50; and $25 on each additional 10,000
shares or part thereof. This statute makes an alternative provision for
calculating the tax by prescribing an arbitrary "assumed no-par capital."
The annual tax is computed upon whichever of the two bases-total nuni-
her of authorized shares or "assumed no-par capital"-yields the smaller
amount.7 Delaware. Revised Code 1935. sec. 2064, 32.
8Del. Code, sec. 97, 63. This report must state the facts as to the
corporation's officers, resident agent, places of business, annual meeting of
stockholders, amount of stock, and capital investments in Delaware. A
fee of $2 is payable to the Secretary of State upon the filing of each re-
port. Del. Code, secs. 2104, 72 and 95. 61. Unless this report also states
the amount of the corporation's gross assets, good will being valued as on
the corporation's books of account, the annual franchise tax will be computed
on the basis of total number of authorized shares rather than on "assumned
no-par capital." See footnote 6 and text thereto.
9 Minn. Stat., sec. 7495-14. This report does not differ greatly from
that required to be filed in Delaware, except that it must also contain a
statement of the value of all property of the corporation and of it% Miin-
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II. ARTICLES
Both Minnesota and Delaware permit perpetual existence of
corporations."0 In both states, in the absence of qualifying pro%'-
sions in the articles of incorporation, the common law rules prevail
as to a stockholder's preemptive right -the right under certain
conditions to subscribe ratably to additional issues of stock." I low-
ever, appropriate provisions in the articles of either Delaware or
Minnesota corporations may qualify, or even eliminate entirely
that right.' 2
The statutory provisions with reference to corporate names do
not differ materially. 3 None the less, a Minnesota corporation ha.
practical advantages in this respect since, because of the greater
number of Delaware corporations, it may be more difficult to obtain
a desired corporate name in that state than in Minnesota.
Both states permit a provision in the articles of incorporation
empowering the directors, without specific authorization by the
stockholders, to fix the dividend rate, redemption price and liqui-
dation price of unissued preferred stock, the Delaware law giving
such permission also with respect to conversion, dividend partici-
pation, and other special rights.14 Delaware directors possess
authority to grant options on unissued shares, whereas in a Minne-
sota corporation such power is lodged in the shareholders unless
nesota property and of the corporation's gross receipts from its total
business and from its Minnesota business for the calendar year as to which
the report is made.
'OMinn. Stat., sec. 7492-3 (b); Del. Code, sec. 2034, 2 (1).
"See Van Slyke v. Norris, (1924) 159 Minn. 63, 68, 198 N. %V. 409:
Kingston v. Home Life Ins. Co., (1917) 11 Del. Ch. 258, 101 Atl. 898. 900.
"-Minn. Stat., sec 7492-3 (i); Del. Code, sec. 2037, 5 (10). If tile
corporation is to have shares of two or more classes, it is often advisable
to qualify or eliminate preemption, for its theoretical justification is usually
not present in such a situation, and it is more of a hindrance to the attain-
ment of legitimate corporate ends than a guaranty of shareholders' rights.
See Drinker, The Preemptive Right of Shareholders, (1930) 43 Harv. L.
Rev. 586, 609-616. Such elimination of preemptive rights would not dis-
turb the right of a stockholder to demand his proportionate share of a new
issue of stock if such new issue amounts to a fraud upon him. See Schwab
v. Schwab-Wilson Mach. Corp'n, (Cal. App., 1936) 55 P. (2d) 1268: and
compare Minfi. Stat., sec. 7492-15 (II), for which see below, note 25.
"3Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-4; Del. Code, sec. 2037, 5 (1).
1'Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-3 (e) ; Del. Code, sec. 2045, 13. For a criticism
of this provision of the Delaware laws as so broad in scope as to permit the
directors to give the holders of a new series priority over the holders of
existing series within the same class, see Dodd, Statutory Developments in
Business Corporation Law, (1936) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 27, 47. As to the
probably narrower scope of the Minnesota provision, see Solether and
Jennings, The Minnesota Business Corporation Act, (1937) 12 Wis. L. Rev.
419, 425, note 27.
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conferred upon the directors pursuant to shareholders' resolution
or to express provision in the articles.15
Delaware corporations, even without the benefit of express pro-
visions in their articles conferring such power, are permitted to
hold stocks and other securities of other corporations.'5 Minnesota
corporations may enjoy an equally broad authority by express pro-
vision therefor in the articles of incorporation; but, in the absence
of such provision, they may hold securities of other corporations
only when reasonably necessary for or incidental to the accomplish-
ment of purposes stated in their articles.1
III. BY-LAWS
The initial by-laws of a Minnesota corporation are adopted by
the first board of directors, but power to make amendments there-
to and all subsequent by-laws is reserved to the shareholders,
unless the articles vest that power in the directors. In any event,
the directors cannot be empowered to make or amend by-laws
fixing their number, qualifications, classifications, or term of office,
nor can the shareholders be deprived of their power to change or
repeal any by-laws that are adopted. 8 The initial by-laws of a
Delaware corporation are adopted by the incorporators, and the
articles may empower the directors to make, alter, or repeal by-
laws thereafter.19 This latter provision appears to permit more
absolute and unchecked power in the directors than is possible in
Minnesota; for, once the articles confer that power upon the direc-
tors, it is unlikely that they will set in motion procedure to amend
it out of the articles.
2 0
IV. STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS
The uniform stock transfer act is in effect in Minnesota with
15Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-13 (VII); Del. Code, sec. 2046, 14. Under
Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-13 (VI), such options may be given "only in connec-
tion with the allotment of shares or issuance of other securities," or by
way of recognition of the pre-emptive rights of existing shareholders.
leDel. Code, sec. 2110, 78.
17Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-9. For a criticism of the apparent inconsistency
of this provision of the Minnesota act as applied to corporate suretyship or
guaranty, see Rutledge, Significant Trends in Modern Incorporation Stat-
utes, (1937) 22 Wash. U. L. Q. 305, 321 ; and for a suggested explanation,
see Solether and Jennings, The Minnesota Business Corporation Act, (1937)
12 Wis. L. Rev. 419, 431, note 52.
IsMinn. Stat., sec. 7492-23 (II).
'9Del. Code, sec. 2044, 12. The number of directors shall be fixed by the
by-laws, rather than by the articles. Gow v. Cons. Coppermines Corp'n,
(1933) 19 Del. Ch. 172, 165 AtI. 136.
2OAmendments to the articles of a Delaware corporation must be pro-
posed by the board of directors. Del. Code, sec. 2058, 25 (1).
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respect to all stock certificates issued on or after July 1, 1933.21 It
is not a part of the Delaware law.2 2
A stockholder in a Delaware corporation, regardless of his
residence, can be sued in Delaware and his stock may be attached
in such action by service upon the corporation's resident agent."
It is needless to suggest the inconvenience and expense to the stock-
holder that would accompany defense of such an action in Dela-
ware.
At common law shareholders or directors of a corporation who
authorize an issue of stock assume the risk of personal liability if
that issue is held to be unfair to existing shareholders.24  The
Delaware statute is silent upon this question, while the Minnesota
act clarifies it and somewhat alleviates its effect. The Minnesota
statute expressly forbids an issuance of stock that is unfair to exist-
ing shareholders ;25 but it recognizes a method, probably sanctioned
by the common law, of protecting good faith issues which, although
they are for the benefit of the corporation, may to some extent
infringe upon the rights of existing shareholders. It does this by
an express statement that an offer of securities is not unfair if
made ratably to shareholders who would be entitled to preemptive
rights (whether or not such rights are waived in the articles), even
though the unsubscribed portion of such issue is thereafter sold to
others at the same price and terms.26 A three-year statute of limi-
tations, running from the date of the allegedly unfair allotment, is
a part of the same section. 27 In the absence of such an express
limitation upon actions, it is probable that the general statute of
limitations does not begin to run until discovery by a plaintiff
shareholder of the unfairness; and this often means, as a practical
matter, that Delaware has no limitation of actions based upon such
unfair issues of stock.28 On the whole, therefore, it would seem
2lMinn. Stat., sec. 7492-95.
226 U.L.A. Supp. 5.
2 Del. Code, sec. 2124. 92. See Ryan v. Galliber, (1933) 5 W. W.
Harr. (Del.) 503, 168 Atl. 77. 78.24See Bodell v. General Gas & Electric Corp., (1926) 15 Del. Ch. 119,
132 At]. 442, 446, 447, aff'd (1927) 15 Del. Ch. 420, 140 Atl. 264.
2-5vfin. Stat., sec. 7492-15 (I). Ordinarily, the shareholder's pre-
emptive right, to subscribe to his proportionate share of a new issue, is
sufficient protection for him in this situation; but where that right is abol-
ished or qualified by the articles of incorporation, as it may be in Min-
nesota and Delaware, he still has protection against new issues that in-
crease the rights and participation of others without a commensurate benefit
to the corporation.
26fMinnr Stat., sec. 7492-15 (I).
271finn. Stat., sec. 7492-15 (IV).
2 81t is clear that a stockholder of a Delaware corporation is entitled to
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that the Minnesota law is more favorable to the management in this
respect than is the Delaware law.
All subscriptions to stock of a Delaware corporation can be
accepted by the directors..29  Directors of a Minnesota corporation
can accept only preincorporation subscriptions unless the articles or
tile shareholders grant them the additional power. otherwise re-
served to the shareholders, to accept post-incorporation sulbscrip-
tions."
The Minnesota statute is more definite than is that of l)elaware
as to the right of the subscriber to revoke his subscription.'" As to
the corporation's rights in regard to the enforcement of subscrip-
tions, the statutes are similar. Minnesota corporations have a lien
upon their shares for the unpaid subscription price, until the cer-
tificate is issued.32 No Minnesota share certificate may be issued
until the subscription price of the shares has been paid in full, and
a check or note is not payment within this rule until it has been
cashed."'
Delaware maintains the common law distinction between a sub-
scription for, and a purchase of, stock,34 which distinction, it is
submitted, is illogical and arbitrary. The Minnesota statute pro-
vides that contracts of purchase and subscriptions have the same
some relief if a new issue of stock impairs his rights and the value of his
shares. See Bodell v. General Gas & Electric Corp., (1926) 15 Del. Clh.
119, 132 At!. 442, 446, 447, aff'd (1927) 15 Del. Ch. 420, 140 Atd. 264. The
Delaware cases have not yet indicated the extent of the relief obtainable and
the mode by which the relief may be secured. The Bodell Case and the
case of Atlantic Refining Co. v. Hodgman, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1936) 13 F.
(2) 781, make the test of the fairness of a new issue of stock a question of
business judgment. This is scant consolation to the directors, who have
no assurance that what seems to them wise and a good business move at
the time of the issuance of the new stock will appeal equally to the businessjudgment of a court when the transaction is challenged some time later.29Del. Code, sec. 2053, 21.
30Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-16 (V).3
'Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-16 (II). It has been held that a subscriber to
stock in a Delaware corporation may revoke his subscription if it has not
yet been accepted and if the corporation has not yet been formed. Collins
v. Morgan Grain Co., (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1926) 16 F. (2) 253.3ZMinn. Stat., sec. 7492-16 (IX, X), is more explicit as to the procedure
for selling a shareholder's stock to pay assessments due than is sec. 2054.
22. Del. Code.
33Minn. Stat.. sec. 7492-17 (1). (III).
31See Smith v. General Motors Corporation, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1923)
289 Fed. 205, 207, where the court points out that, upon breach of a con-
tract to purchase stock, the corporation must mitigate damages by selling
at the market price, which is not true where there is breach of a sub-
scription contract. For a general discussion of the differences between
subscriptions and contracts to sell, see 4 Fletcher. Corporations, perm. ed..
sec. 1372, pp. 27-33.
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status, 35 and that the purchaser or subscriber is treated as a share-
holder to the extent of the payments made by him, unless the con-
tract or subscription agreement curtails such rights.30
Stockholders' liability is substantially the same in the two state,.
In both, such liability, apart from the doctrine of the Hospes Case
hereinafter mentioned, extends only to the unpaid portion of the
subscription price, in the absence of actual fraud.37  The Hosp's
Case is the leading case in Minnesota and, indeed, a leading ca.,e
nationally, on the question of a shareholder's liability where his
shares were issued to him for a consideration in cash, property, or
services of a value less than the aggregate par value of such
shares. 8 That case established the doctrine, recognized by statute
in Delaware, that a creditor in becoming such will be presumed to
have relied on the implied representation of the corporation that it
received property equal in value to the par value of all its issued
shares upon the issuance thereof, and hence, that a person becoming
a creditor after the issue of stock for a consideration worth less
than its par value may, in event of insolvency of the corporation,
recover from the stockholder, or his assignee with notice, the di f-
ference between the par value of such stock and the value of the
consideration received therefor. In practice, such presumption was
conclusive and, since the statute of limitations began to run only
upon insolvency, 9 it afforded little protection. In Minnesota this
doctrine has been altered by the Minnesota Business Corporation
Act to remove the presumption in favor of the creditor, and to
35Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-16 (XI). But it is doubtful if this provision
was intended to require the result that there can be no such thing as an
executory contract to subscribe or conditional subscription in Minnesota.
See Solether and Jennings, The Minnesota Business Corporation Act, (1937)
12 Wis. L. Rev. 419, 438.
36Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-16 (VIII). But it would seem that the scope
of this provision must be restricted to the subscriber's "rights," and not be
construed to prevent the status of shareholder, as regards liabilities at-
tached to that status, from arising in respect of shares subscribed but not
fully paid for. See Solether and Jennings, The Minnesota Business Cor-
poration Act, (1937) 12 Wis. L. Rev. 419, 439.
37Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-18 (I) ; Del. Code. sec. 2052, 20.
38Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co.. (1892) 48 .Min. 174. 50
N. W. 1117, 15 L. R. A. 470, 31 Am. St. Rep. 637.39See Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co., (1892) 48 Minn. 174.
200, 50 N. W. 1117, 15 L. R. A. 470, 31 Am. St. Rep. 637. where the court
points out that the creditor sues on his own behalf and that the corporation
never had a cause of action against the shareholders. It appears that a
creditor of a Delaware corporation sues on his own behalf also, and so the
same rule would apply. Del. Code, sec. 2081. 49. See John W. Cooney
Co. v. Arlington Hotel Co., (1917) 11 Del. Ch. 286, 101 At. 879, 885,
aff'd, du Pont v. Ball. (1918) 11 Del. Ch. 430. 106 Atl. 39.
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make the shareholders or directors voting for such issue liable, as
well as those receiving the shares; and, further, to relieve the
shareholder of liability if he can prove that he did not know of the
overvaluation.4 0 Minnesota extends this modified Hospos Case
doctrine to stock without par value, the stated capital assigned to
such stock being deemed its par value for such purpose.4' The
modification of the Hospes doctrine and the existence of a three-
year statute of limitations running from the date of the share
allotment would seem to make the Minnesota statute more favorable
to directors and shareholders than is that of Delaware, and more
nearly in accord with actualities.
There is no great difference between Delaware and Minnesota
law as to the right of a shareholder to examine the corporation's
books.4 2  Minnesota gives him an additional right-to obtain by
request a condensed balance sheet and a profit and loss statement,
showing separately the amounts of dividends paid from paid-in
surplus.4' The Minnesota statute gives creditors of corporations
related rights. A creditor must be furnished, within thirty days of
his request for the same, with a statement of all dividends paid by
the corporation, and the number and purchase price of its own
shares bought by the corporation, and a description and the valua-
tion of any property or services received by the corporation upon
4OMinn. Stat., sec. 7492-14 (IV), (V). By these sections the Hospes
Case doctrine is further modified to make the creditor's action one on be-
half of the corporation rather than one in his own behalf. Del. Code, sec.
2052, 20, also relieves a stockholder of liability if he acquires his shares in
good faith, not knowing of the underpayment. Under the provision of the
Minnesota act the directors and other shareholders voting for the allotment
are liable only if they did so "wilfully or without reasonable investigation."
4XMinn. Stat., sec. 7942-14 (III). The Delaware statute cited in the
previous footnote limits the liability of a holder of non-par stock to the
amount of the consideration for which the stock was issued and which
he knows to have been unpaid. For a discussion of the statute, see Harman
v. Himes, (App. D.C. 1935) 77 F. (2) 375. The Minnesota statutes make
express provision for relief only to creditors who have been damaged by
the issuance of bonus shares. Quaere, whether shareholders who have
been damaged do not have a similar right. It is clear that stockholders of
a Delaware corporation are entitled to such relief. Scully v. Automobile
Finance Co., (1920) 12 Del. Ch. 174, 109 Atl. 49. But under the Minnesota
act such rights of stockholders might well be governed by the provision of
Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-15 (II).
42Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-33 (V). The common law of Delaware gives
a stockholder the right to examine the corporate books. State ex rel. De
Julvecourt v. Pan American Co., (1904) 5 Penn. (Del.) 391, 61 Ati. 398,
aff'd (1906) 63 Ati. 1118. In the absence of a statute authorizing such
modification, the corporation cannot by its articles remove the stockholder's
right to examine the books and records. State ex rel. Cochran v. Penn-
Beaver Oil Co., (1926) 4 Harr. (Del.) 81, 143 Atd. 257.43Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-34 (I).
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allotment of any of its shares during tht preceding three-year
period. If these are wilfully refused, the obligation of the corpora-
tion to such creditor immediately becomes due." The reason for
the added rights that are conferred by the Minnesota statute lies in
the three-year state of limitations, mentioned in connection with the
discussion of the modification of the Hospes Case doctrine, which
would bar some claims of even diligent creditors if such creditors
were not given a chance to find out whether or not they had,
through the corporation, a cause of action.4
The Minnesota statute is more explicit as to notice and call of
shareholders' meetings than is the Delaware statute. 0 In Minnesota
shareholders and directors may act by a writing signed by all the
members of their respective groups, without the necessity of a
meeting.47 This is a decided advantage to small corporations, and
to corporations whose shares are closely held, for the necessity of
meetings of directors and shareholders of such corporations in
cases where sentiment is unanimous is so much red tape. In both
Minnesota and Delaware corporations, shareholders or directors
may make effective written waiver of notice of a meeting, even
after the meeting is held.' 8
Shareholders of a Minnesota corporation may cumulate their
votes unless the articles negative such right, 9 but stockholders of
a Delaware corporation do not have this right unless it is expressly
authorized by the articles.50
Shareholders of Minnesota corporations may remove directors
without cause, and directors may remove officers without cause,
44Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-34 (II, III, IV). Del. Code, sec. 2061, 29. per-
mits a corporation, by its articles, to confer upon bond and debenture
holders the same rights with respect to the inspection of corporate books
and records, or in any other respect, that are conferred thereby upon the
stockholders.
45Note that this liability is to the corporation rather than to the credi-
tor himself. See footnote 40. Cf. Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-22 (A) and -22 (B),
which relate to unlawful dividends or illegal purchase of corporation's own
shares where liability is also to the corporation.46Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-24; Del. Code, sec. 2064, 32. .Minnesota also
makes specific provision for notice and call of directors' meetings. Minn.
Stat., sec. 7492-27 (IV, (d), (e)).
47Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-25 (XI), 7492-27 (IV (g)). By a 1937
amendment a similar provision was made in the Delaware statute for the
benefit of the stockholders. Del. Code, sec. 2113, 81, as amended.
48Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-27 (IV (d)), directors' wai'er: sec. 7492-24(VI), shareholder's waiver; Del. Code. sec. 2113, 81.
49Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-25 (III). See. generally, Bowes and DeBow,
Cumulative Voting at Elections of Directors of Corporations. (1937) 21
MINNESOTA LAW REvIEw 351.
5ODel. Code, sec. 2049, 17.
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subject to contract rights; but neither officers nor directors of Dela-
ware corporations can be removed without cause.5'
Minnesota has a comparatively liberal rule with respect to vot-
it,g trusts, which may be created for a fifteen-year period or for the
period of any indebtedness of the corporation that they may be
given to secure.52 A voting trust of stock in a Delaware corpora-
tion can endure for ten years.5 3
Holders of a majority of the voting shares may authorize the
sale of all assets of a Delaware corporation, but its articles may
require a greater percentage. 4 Such action must be approved by
holders of not less than two-thirds of the voting shares of a Minne-
sota corporation, unless its articles provide for some other per-
centage not less than a majority. Minnesota also requires that
notice of a meeting for such action be given to all non-voting
shareholders."
V. DIVIDENDS
The "stated capital" of a Minnesota corporation is equivalent
to the "capital" of a Delaware corporation."' The Delaware statute,
however, makes no distinction between paid-in and earned surplus,
5"Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-28 (1), directors' removal; sec. 7492-29
(1I1), officers' removal. See Realty Acceptance Corporation v. Mont-
gomery, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1930) 51 F. (2) 636. But under the provision of
the Minnesota act a single director may not be removed, in the case of a
corporation having cumulative voting, "if a sufficient number of shares are
cast against his removal, which if then cumulatively voted at an election of
the full board would be sufficient to elect him."
52Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-26 (I).53Del. Code, sec. 2050, 18. Such a trust for a longer period than ten
years is wholly invalid. Perry v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., (Del. Ch.
1937) 191 Atl. 823, noted in (1938) 22 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEw 276. On
the question of the necessity of transfer upon corporation's books to empower
trustee to vote, compare In re Chilson, (Del. Ch. 1933) 168 Ati. 82, with
Smith v. First Personal Bankers Corp., (Del. Ch. 1934) 171 Ati. 839.
5 4Del. Code, sec. 2097, 65. This section expressly requires action by
the directors, but it has been held that the officers may sell upon authoriza-
tion of the stockholders where the directors take no action. Bacich v. North-
land Transportation Co., (1932) 185 Minn. 544, 242 N.W. 379.
55Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-35. The Minnesota statute expressly permits
a sale of all assets where the consideration for the sale is property. The
Delaware statute makes no such provision. But in the case of a corporation
in failing circumstances even though not insolvent, it would seem arguable
that the requirement of a two-thirds vote of the shareholders, where the
articles do not provide for less, should not be held applicable. See Solether
and Jennings, The Minnesota Business Corporation Act, (1937) 12 Wis. L.
Rev. 419, 442, and note 106.
5GMinn. Stat., sec. 7492-20, Del. Code. sec. 2046. 14. The capital of
Delaware and Minnesota corporations must be equal to or in excess of tile
par value of its capital stock. Directors of both Delaware and 
Minnesota
corpus have the power to determine what part of the consideration 
received
for no-par shares shall constitute capital.
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and this distinction is carefully maintained by the Minnesota law.--
If both preferred and common shares are outstanding, dividends
from paid-in surplus of a Minnesota corporation can be declared
only upon shares entitled to preferential dividends,"8 although divi-
dends upon either class of shares can be declared from earned
surplus. 9 Minnesota requires that notice of the fact that dividends
are being paid out of paid-in surplus be given concurrently with the
payment of such dividends.60 The Minnesota rule is as stringent
where surplus is used to purchase shares, instead of being distrib-
uted in the form of dividends. If there are preferred and common
shares outstanding, only shares entitled to preferential dividends
or to a preference upon liquidation can be purchased with paid-in
surplus, while shares of either class can be purchased with earned
surplus.1
In both Minnesota and Delaware, dividends in cash or property
are payable from either of two sources-surplus or current earn-
ings.2  And both states require a valuation of the corporation's
assets to determine whether a surplus exists, Minnesota e.xpressly'
and Delaware by clear implication.6 It is questionable whether
unrealized appreciation of the assets can be included in such valua-
tion of the assets of a Delaware corporation. 5 The Minnesota
statute forbids the inclusion of unrealized appreciation, except that
readily marketable securities, other than those of the corporation
itself, may be included at no more than their market value."
As to the second source of dividends-current earnings-Min-
nesota permits payment out of the corporation's net earnings for
the current or the next preceding fiscal year, 7 while Delaware per-
57Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-20, 7492-21 (II (a) (b), III (a) (b), VI(a) (b)).58Minn. Stat, sec. 7492-21 (II (b)). By subdivision III (b) of this
section, this requirement is removed where a dividend payable in shares is
declared.
59Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-21 (II (a), III (a)).
6Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-21 (II (b), III (b)).
61Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-21, VI.
62Minn. Stat, sec. 7492-21, II, (c) ; Del. Code, sec. 2066, 34.
63Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-21, I. Note, however, that this subsection of
the statute also provides that if payment of a dividend is otherwise lawful,
it shall not be unlawful for failure to determine the fair value of the cor-
poration's assets.
64Del. Code, sec. 2066, 34.
65See Vogtman v. Merchant's Mtge. & Credit Co., (1935) 20 Del.
Ch. 364, 178 Atl. 99, 102.
60Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-21 (I).
67Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-21, II, (c).
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mits payment from net earnings for the current and/or preceding
fiscal year."
Both states make directors who wilfully or negligently vote in
favor thereof personally liable for illegal dividends."9 However,
directors of Delaware corporations are protected by a statutory
provision allowing them to rely upon statements of an officer of the
corporation, both as to the corporation's net profits and as to the
value of its assets.7 0  In Minnesota, reliance can be placed only
upon such statements as to earnings.7 1  Once again, however,
Minnesota has a three-year statute of limitations as to actions based
on illegal dividends,72 and the certainty and definiteness of this
statute probably afford as much protection as do the provisions of
the Delaware law.
VI. ULTRA VIRES ACTS, AMENDMENTS OF ARTICLES, MERGER
AND CONSOLIDATION
There has been no statutory modification of the common law
rules as to ultra vires in Delaware. This may be of little practical
importance in Minnesota, as the effect of ultra vires actions in
Minnesota may be determined by reference to Minnesota law even
though the acting corporation be incorporated in Delaware.3 The
Minnesota law that would govern this situation is our common law
as to the effect of ultra vires acts, which law applies also to those
Minnesota corporations that have elected not to come under the
Minnesota Business Corporations Act. The Minnesota common
;8Del. Code, sec. 2066, 34.
69Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-22, I (b) ; Del. Code, sec. 2067, 35. The
stockholder distributees of such dividends are also liable for their return under
this provision of the Minnesota act, apparently without regard to their good
faith in receiving them. The rule of the prior Minnesota case of Mackall v.
Pocock, (1917) 136 Minn. 8, 161 N. W. 228, apparently is retained, so that
subsequent as well as prior creditors will be entitled to share in the benefit
of the corporation's right of recovery. The Minnesota act does not attempt
to solve any question of primary liability as between the shareholder dis-
tributees and the directors "who wilfully or negligently voted in favor" of
such distributions.7ODel. Code, sec. 2066, 34. By this section. a director may rely upon
"statements prepared by any of its [the corporation's] officials .... ," which
indicates that such statements should be in writing. And Del. Code. sec.
2069, 37, apparently shifts the liability of a director who relied upon such
a statement to the officer who, knowing it to be false, prepared the statement.
7lMinn. Stat., sec. 7492-22, I, (b).72 Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-22, II.
73According to the Restatement, the effect of an ultra vires act is to
be determined by the law of the state where the act is done. Restatement.
Conflicts, sec. 166, c. But see Building & Loan Ass'n v. Ebaugh, (1902) 185
U. S. 114, 120, 22 Sup. Ct. 566, 46 L. Ed. 830; cf. Graysonia-Nashville
Lumber Co. v. Goldman, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1918) 247 Fed. 423, 428.
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law as to ultra vires acts follows the liberal "general capacity"
doctrine. 74
Minnesota common law rules as to the effect of ultra vires acts
of Minnesota corporations subject to the Minnesota Business Cor-
poration Act have been expressly modified by that act. In general,
ultra vires acts of a Minnesota corporation under the act are en-
forceable by parties not officers or directors of the corporation,
unless they had actual knowledge of the ultra vires character of
such acts.75  This may or may not be of advantage to the corpora-
tion, but it is felt that the rule is fairer to the public at large than
were the stricter common law doctrines as to the effect of ultra
vires acts.
Proceedings to amend articles of Minnesota and Delaware cor-
porations do not differ very much. In the absence of other require-
ments in the articles of a Delaware corporation, a favorable vote of
a majority of the voting shares will authorize an amendment,
unless the amendment affects some class of shareholders in one of
the respects cited in the statute, in which event the proposed amend-
ment must also secure the favorable vote of the majority of shares
of that class. 78 Amendments to the articles of a Minnesota corpora-
tion may be effected by a two-thirds vote of the voting shares, or
by a majority thereof if one-fourth of the shares are not voted in
opposition to the change, unless the articles fix some other per-
centage which may not be less than a majority. The same percent-
age rules apply to the vote required from adversely affected classes
of Minnesota shareholders."
Delaware statutes expressly permit an amendment materially
changing the purposes set forth in the corporation's articles, and
such amendment may be made upon approval of a majority of the
voting stock.78 The Minnesota statute requires the favorable vote
7 4See Benson Lumber Co. v. Thornton, (1932) 185 Minn. 230, 237-
239, 240 N.W. 651.
75Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-11, II. But if such person, even though
having knowledge, has fully performed the ultra vires transaction on his own
part, he would seem to have full contractual rights against the corporation
under the prior case of Marin v. Calmenson, (1924) 158 Minn. 282. 197 N.W.
262. It is doubtful whether this provision of the Minnesota act was in any
way intended to create the defense of ultra vires, in a situation in which it
would not have been available under the Minnesota common law.7aDel. Code, sec. 2058, 26. Amendments that change or alter ad-
versely the preferences, special rights or powers of a particular class of stock
or increase or decrease the amount or par value of authorized stock of such
class must receive the approval of a majoirty of the shares of such class.77Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-36, 7492-37.78Del. Code, sec. 2058, 26.
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of each class of stock, in the proportions mentioned in the preceding
paragraph ;7" and provides for the purchase by the corporation of
the shares of dissenting shareholders at their appraised value. 80
This right is also given to the dissenting shareholders who object
to an amendment extending the corporation's existence.8' How-
ever, such dissent must be registered in writing before the meeting
at which action is to be taken, so that, if too many shareholders
dissent, the plan may be abandoned.
Statutory provisions as to merger and consolidation of Dela-
ware corporations and of Minnesota corporations are much alike.
However, a Delaware corporation may merge with a corporation
of a foreign state to result in a foreign corporation."2 Before 1937
the Minnesota statutes made no provision for merger of a domestic
with a foreign corporation. Under the Business Corporation Act,
as amended, merger of a domestic with a foreign corporation must
result in a Minnesota corporation." One result of the amendment
is that certain mergers or consolidations, which formerly might
have resulted in liability to pay a federal income tax, may be made
without such liability.
The Business Corporation Laws of both Minnesota and Dela-
ware are subject to alteration, amendment, or repeal by virtue of
statutory reservations of power so to change the laws. The statu-
tory reservations of power are alike in the two states."'
79
.Minn. Stat., scc. 7492-36, 111. (d).
50Min. Stat., sec. 7492-39. The Delaware statute also gives a stock-
holder who files written objection to a merger or consolidation the right to
payment for his stock. Del. Code. sec. 2093. 61. Under the Minnesota act
such purchase cannot be consummated if to do so would render the corpora-
tion insolvent in the assets-liabilities sense. Otherwise this situation cleates
an enforced exception to the rule of -Minn. Stat.. sec. 7492-21 (VI) that the
corporation's own shares can be reacquired only from surplus.
81A 1935 amendment to this section (Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-39 IV).
which removed this right as to shareholders of corporations now under the
Minnesota Business Corporation Act but which had been organized prior to
the effective date of the Act for the maximum ptriod then permitted In
statute, was held invalid in the case of Warnock Co. v. Fludsonl Mfg. (o..
(Minn. 1937) 273 N.V. 710. on the ground that the classification wa,
unreasonable. For a discussion of this case, see (1937) 22 MNISNT,:soA L.AW
REF.InW 108.
82 Del. Code. sec. 2091. 59. By a 1937 amendment (Sec. 59A) De:a-
ware authorizes the directors, by resolution, to merge the corporation with
any subsidiary of which it owns all the stock, whether such subsidiary be a
Delaware corporation or a foreign corporation organized under the laws of
a state permitting such merger.8
*
5 Minn. Stat., sec. 7492-30. as amended by C'h. 150. 1937 Session
Laws.84 Minn. Stat.. sec. 7492-60: Del. Code. sec. 2115. 83. It has been
suggested that this reserved power is not effective to authorize the state bly
amendment to authorize the corporation to impair the obligation of contracts
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In summary, it may be said that the Delaware law was drafted
on the principle of lodging comparatively extensive powers in the
directors and the management. The Minnesota law, on the other
hand, is based on the assumption that shareholders should be given
a rather large element of control, unless they voluntarily relinquish
a portion thereof by purchasing securities in a corporation whose
articles expressly enlarge the powers of the directors and manage-
ment. By appropriate provision in the articles of incorporation it
is thought that sufficiently broad powers can be conferred upon the
management and directors of a Minnesota corporation, and, at the
same time, the Minnesota statutes do, as a whole, confer upon
shareholders greater protection and control. The necessity of ex-
press provisions in the articles, if the powers of the directors are to
be increased, should in itself constitute some protection to share-
holders.
Problems of taxation, the residence of interested parties in other
states, and contemplated sales of securities without Minnesota may
dictate the choice of incorporation in Delaware rather than in Min-
nesota. In the typical case, however, of a corporation which will
conduct its business chiefly in Minnesota and whose shareholders
will be chiefly Minnesota residents, Minnesota incorporation, on
the whole, seems preferable to incorporation in Delaware.
between it and its stockholders. Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co..(D.C. R.I. 1929) 34 F. (2d) 533. This case criticizes the decision of Davis
v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., (1928) 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 AtlI. 654. For
a reconciliation of these cases, on the ground that the charter of the corpora-
tion involved in the latter decision also reserved the right to amend pursuant
to any authority later conferred by statute, see (1936) Del. Corporation Law
Annotated, p. 219.
It has been held, without reliance upon express reservation of the right
of alteration, amendment, or repeal, that a state has power to modify general
corporate laws as to unexercised powers conferred thereby. Warnock Co. v.
Hudson Mfg. Co., (Minn. 1937) 273 N.W. 710.
